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Abstract
The present work is intended to be an informal introduction to the theory of abstract logi-
cal groups. This particular formalization stems from some concepts of abstract algebra and the
Johnson-Keynes’s theory of groups. Therefore the aim of this paper is that of provide the readers
with the logical reasoning behind this brand new theory. I shall depict the philosophical notions
as bases of the Keynes’s probability and then I shall explain it in terms of group. Furthermore we
shall see, albeit roughly, a first definition of abstract groups.
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1. In order to comprehend the probability’s meaning of Keynes, we have to deal with a precise
definition of knowledge. In treating this concept, it is chiefly plain the influence of the Russell’s phi-
losophy during the early 20th century. I shall not concern about a thorough examination on the strict
philosophical relations betwixt Mr. Keynes and Mr. Russell, but I do have to clarify some notions
about them inasmuch as we are dealing with the logical framework of the Keynes’s probability. By
studying Russell’s philosophy it is unavoidable to come across both the notion of knowledge and
acquaintance. The knowledge by acquaintance may be considered as a foundation of all our knowl-
edge [CtR]. Thus, the ’knowledge’ is divided into of things and of truths. Furthermore, ’of things’
is divided into by acquaintance and by description, whereas ’of truth’ is divided into intuitive and
derivative. The relation between the knowledge of things and the knowledge of truths gives us the
logical conclusion that by acquaintance is the primitive knowledge. Thus, by [CtR]1:
Kd _ K′ _ Ki _ Ka.
When one deals with Mr. Keynes’s probability, Ka can be thought of as a direct knowledge, rather
even in Keynes there is a concept of purest knowledge. The knowledge of things is thus linked to an
experience of them, hence it is connected to the acquaintance. It is worthwhile noting that the acquisi-
tion of some kind of information by whatsoever experience it is not enough in so far as one is dealing
with probability, one needs the intuition. Thus, intuition and acquaintance give rise a knowledge, in
few words, they give rise a level of rational belief: certainty. In this case we have the highest degree
of rational belief in so far we have a knowledge dirtectly from an experience that has been preceived.
This is linked to ’by truths’, rather we know a proposition when it is in fact true, otherwise we cannot
know it. In [KeP], Keynes identifies three different ways of acquisition by direct acquaintance: sensa-
tion, meaning and perception[FSP]. We have not a knowledge yet, albeit they give rise our knowledge.
We have a sensation when we have an experience of a direct acquaintance, we understand ideas or
meaning about which we have thoughts, we percieve facts, characteristics, relation of sense-data or
meaning [KeP]. Whilst these are the objects of direct acquaintance, the objects of knowledge and
belief are termed propositions. Thus the objects of them are intensely different from each other. We
call the space of the objects of acquaintance direct space and we denote it by Ka and the space of
proposition Pk. One ought to note that Ka∪ Pk = ∅ but:
`Ka⊃`Pk
thus as a matter of definition of acquaintance:
:.φ(κ).⊃κ .ψ(κ).κ∈V Df.
It is obvious that κ is an object of acquaintance thereby it is always true (namely it belongs to V).
Therefore if the propositional function φ(κ) ∈ V implies ψ(κ) ∈ V. By defining this implication there
1For the sake of elegance we denote: ’by description’ by Kd, ’derivative’ by K′, ’intuitive’ by Ki and ’by acquaintance’
by Ka and the ’depends on’ relation by_.
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is a novel concept that may pass unnoticed: φ(·). This semi-propositional function does not concern
sentences like ’κ is tall’ but perceptions, understanding and so forth. It is the ground upon which
ψ(·) acquires a meaning. We do not have to call φ(·) a propositional function, firstly because of its
nature, it is not belonged to Pk. Consequentially one cannot give a value to an object of Ka, and thus
κ ∈ Ka is not even a variable. I reckon that φ(κ) could be seen as a collection of some objects of
direct-knowledge:
φ(κ) =
n⋃
i
κi
and it is straightforward that φ(·) is a collection of (what I like to call) sparks. The notion of the spark-
object says that one has a[the] pure[st] perception (lato sensu) which is not well-defined in meaning
but it is fundamental for his understanding, he has not a knowledge, he is staring something which is
sparkling through the darkness before his mind, before his capacity of comprehension. It is possible
to obtain a knowledge of a spark by using ψ(·). The latter is undoubtedly a propositional function,
rather it settles who is κ. The figurative existence of spark-objects is justified by a priori truths which
are true in any possible world [CtR].
The symbol of probability is a/h; our premisses consist of any set of propositions h and our conclu-
sion consist of any set of propositions a. This symbol is of utmost importance because of its clearness,
rather it conveys that there is a probability relation between a and h. Thus, as Russell has said, ’h in
this symbol represents and etails much of Mr. Keynes’s philosophy’. Rather it is in h that knowledge
plays its significant role. Each relation, each kind of knowledge, each spark and each value is encom-
passed in h. Thus, whilst the subjective part is played by h, the objective one is expressed by a/h. This
statment is important and says that the probability relation is objective once the subjective ground has
been built by our knowledge (from our acquaintance and thus by the sparks). We have to look at a/h
as a particular kind of aRb. As a matter of fact when one infers as of h, he uses a particular path which
it is not as general as R. We could state that a/h is a sub-relation of R.
In Keynes’s probability we have to distinguish between:
Belief rational and irrational; certain in degree and only
probable.
Knowledge direct or indirect; of primary or of secondary
proposition; according as it is of or merely about
its object.
Thus, it is preferable to regard knowledge as fundamental and to define rational belief by reference
to it. Thereby, we have to focus on the important meaning of ’rational’. In [KeP], Keynes depicted
rational beliefs as follows:
If a man believes something for a reason which is preposterous or for no reason at all,
and what he believes turns out to be true for some reason not known to him, he cannot
be said to believe it rationally, although he believes it and it is in fact true. On the other
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hand, a man may rationally believe a proposition to be probable when it is in fact false.
The distinction between rational belief and mere belief, is not the same as the distinction
between true beliefs and false beliefs. The highest degree of rational belief, which is
termed certain rational beliefs, corresponds to knowledge [KeP].
In order to comprehend his reasoning it would be better off considering an axiomatization of the actual
meaning of ’rational’:
• xRy.yRz. ⊃x,y .xRz or ` . x = y.y = z. ⊃ .x = z (transitive);
• ` . x = x (reflexive);
• ` . x = y. ≡ .y = x (symmetrical).
Thus a reasoning based upon a direct contemplation of a spark which is regarding the three axioms
above is called rational. It is important to notice that one has to know by what his reasoning is made
of, how he has built it up and why he infers something. Therefore he can prove that his reasoning
entails the three axioms. A rational belief in its highest degree is called certain, thereby we could
obtain a knowledge of a proposition. This reasoning evokes the notion of primary and secondary
proposition and thus the notion of argument. Therefore a proposition b that we know is different from
the proposition p in which we have probable degree q of rational belief. Now given an h, in the sense
specified above, then b is the proposition p which bears the probability-relation of degree q to the set
of proposition h; and this knowledge justifies us in a rational belief of degree q in the proposition p
[KeP]. It is plain that a knowledge of a proposition implies the certainty of rational belief and the truth
of its proposition. In Keynes’s words:
′The peculiarity of certainty is that knowledge of secondary proposition involving certainty, together
with knowledge of what stands in this secondary proposition in the position of evidence, leads to
knowledge of, and not merely about, the corresponding primary proposition. Knowledge, on the other
hand, of a secondary proposition involving a degree of probability lower than certainity, together with
knowledge of the premiss of the secondary proposition, leads only to rational belief of the appropriate
degree in the primary proposition′ [KeP].
It is worthwile noting that the direct knowledge is the result of contemplating those objects belonged
to Ka and the indirect fashion is by means of the so called argument, thereby through perceiving the
probability-relation of the proposition, about which we seek knowledge, to other proposition [KeP].
Thus, by argument, we know a secondary proposition involving the proposition we are looking for,
hence it is a knowledge about. It is of utmost importance to understand that one passes from a knowl-
edge of a proposition x to a knowledge about a proposition y by perceiving a logical relation between
them which one can contemplate by direct acquaintance.
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2. Keynes says that ′the theory of probability deals with the relation between two sets of proposi-
tions, such that, if the first set is known to be true, the second can be known with the appropriate
degree of probabiliry by argument from the first. The relation, however, also exists when the first set
is not known to be true and is hypothetical′[KeP]. Thus Keynes talks about the collection of propo-
sitions logically involved in the premisses and he calls it group. Actually he has acquired the notion
of group from Sir. Johnson, rather he wrote in a footnote [JWE]: the term group is here used in its
precise mathematical meaning. In [JWE] we come across the notion of compound propositions as
those propositions constructed out of two or more simple propositions. The different forms of the
main (compound) proposition hinge on the different conjunctions it may assume. It is thus important
the difference between conjunctive and conjuncts. The former are relations’ meaning and symbols
stricto sensu, i.e. and is par excellence conjunctive, whereas the latter are the components. Therefore
the proposition ′p and q′ assumes a certain form by the conjunctive ′and′ and the conjuncts ′p,q′.
The use of the conjunctive ′and′ is not the same as the use of the enumerative ′and′. Following [JWE],
whilst the former treats components combinatorially, the latter treats them severally. Therefore ′p and
q′ are two proposition by using the enumerative ′and′, whereas it is one proposition by using the
conjunctive ′and′. In conjoining two or more propositions we are realising their joint force. Thus, fol-
lowing [JWE], when one infers from the conjunctive proposition ′p and q′ a set of propositions, these
cannot be inferred from neither p alone or q alone. Given the joint-value, the term group appears.
With ′p,q′ as components we can generate several groups: the two groups of propositions implied
by p, by q respectively, the two groups of propositions implied by ′p and q′, ′q and p′; if there were
three components ′q,p,r′ we would have another group consisting of propositions implied by ′p and
q and r′. The importance of the notion of group in [KeP] can be understood in Keynes’s words: ′we
define a group as containing all the propositions logically involved in any of the premisses or in
any conjunction of them; and as excluding all the propositions the contradictories of which are logi-
cally involved in any of the premisses or in any of the conjunction of them. To say, therefore, that a
proposition follows from a premiss, is the same thing as to say that it belongs to the group which the
premiss specifies′[KeP]. Yet by the idea of group one can define either logical consistency or logical
inconsistency of premisses: ′if any part of the premisses specifies a group containing a proposition,
the contradictory of which is contained in a group specified by some other part, the premisses are
logically inconsistent; otherwise they are logically consistent. In short, premisses are inconsistent if a
proposition follows from one part of them, and its contradictory from another part′[KeP].
The meaning of follows from or logically involved in stems from the Mr. Russell’s Logic of implica-
tion. This kind of implication is called formal implication, it states that for all possible values of x, if
the hypothesis φx is true, the conclusion ψx is true [RWP]. Thus a formal implication
(x) : φx. ⊃ .ψx
may be interpreted as: all values of x which satisfy φx satisfy ψx [RWP], where a value x is said
to satisfy φx or φxˆ when φx is true for that value of x [RWP]. Thus, since φx. ⊃ .ψx will always
be true when φx is false, it is only the values of x that make φx true that are important in a formal
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implication; what is effectively stated is that, for all these values, ψx is true [RWP]. We may rewrite
the formal implication
φx. ⊃x .ψx :=: (x) : φx. ⊃ .ψx
Now it is important to define what Keynes precisely intends when one says that one proposition
follows from another. Thus following [KeP], a group of propositions is a set of propositions such that:
• if the proposition ′p is formally true′ belongs to a group, all propositions which are instances of
the same formal propositional function also belong to it;
• if the proposition p and the proposition ′p implies q′ both belong to it, then the proposition q
also belongs to it;
• if any proposition p belongs to it, then the contradictory of p is excluded from it.
It is thus important to define the fundamental propositions which characterize a group. Therefore the
propositions p1, p2, · · · , pn are called fundamental to the group h when they themselves belong to the
group, if between them they completely specify a group; and if none of them belong to the group
specified by the rest (for if pr belongs to the group specified by the rest, this term is redundant) [KeP].
It is now surely plain that a proposition follows from given premiss if it is included in the group which
the premiss specifies, that is to say, a proposition is certain (a/h = 1) in relation to a given premiss. It
is impossible (a/h = 0) if its contradictory follows from the premiss. Given an evidence, two propo-
sitions are contradictory to one another when they are in juxtaposition with that evidence and they
are inconsistent given that they do not belong to the same group. Furthermore, we face a degree of
probability when a proposition is not itself included in a group specified by the premiss and whose
contradictory is not included either [KeP].
In [JWE] there is a difference between certified and uncertified proposition, albeit it is a subjective
one, given that an uncertified proposition may become certified. This may happen, for example, with
increased observations and the distinction is temporal and relative to individuals and their means of
acquiring knowledge [JWE]. This statement is very important so as to make a probabilistic reasoning.
When we face certified proposition we have to clarify which kind of certification it is: formally or
experentially certified. The former occurs when the truth of a proposition is certified by pure thought
or reason, whereas the latter is certified on the ground of actual experience [JWE]. Now the reasoning
is: ′while we define a formally certifiable proposition as one which can be certified by thought or
reason alone, we do not define experiental propositions as those which can be certified by experience
alone, but rather as those which can only be certified with the aid of experience. In this way we imply
that experience alone would be inadequate′ [JWE]. Thus because of Sir. Johnson that Keynes take
into account the intuition besides the experience.
Foregoing statments are treated in [KeP], but Keynes divides the moment of certification into hypo-
thetical groups and real groups. Furthermore there is the important notion of requirement. It is a first
cousin of the concept of necessity in [JWE]. The requrement resembles that of the kantian necessity
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and it is not the Johnson’s nomic. Yet it deals with the laws of nature taken alone do not necessitate
any event whatever; we should have rather to say that a law of nature necessitates that the happen-
ing of some one thing should necessitate the happening of a certain other thing [JWE]. Rather the
Johnson’s nomic and contingent characterise a fact whereas certified and uncertified characterise a
proposition. Thus the requirement deals with formal certification. We say that ′p requires q′ when we
cannot know p to be true unless we already know q. It is obvious that if p/h = 1 and q/h , 1 then
p does not require q given that p belongs to the real group and q does not belong. Furthermore we
say that p requires q when there is no real group to which p belongs and q does not belong. Now, if
the fundamental group is uniquely determined, a group h′ is a sub-group to the ground h, if the set
fundamental to h′ is included in the set fundamental to h [KeP]. Given that we can say that p does
not require q within the group h if p ∈ h and h′ ⊂ h (in this case it means subset and not a logical
implication) then p ∈ h′ and q < h′. In other words if h′/h = 1, p/h′ = 1 and q/h′ , 1. Furthermore,
we say that the probability relation of p does not require q within the group h, if given h′′ ⊂ h′ ⊂ h
(intended as subsets) and that h′/h′′ = 1, h′′/h = 1, we have p/h′′ = p/h′ and q/h′ , q/h.
The logical priority follows the requirement concept, rather p is prior to q when p does not require
q but q does require p. We say that p is prior to q within the group h when p does not require q
within the group whereas q requires p within the group. From these statments follow that there is no
proposition prior to a fundamental one.
3. We have seen that the Keynes’s probability can be understood by means of those particular
groups. For example a premiss of an argument must be formally or experientially certified, hence
our premiss and our argument must be of the same group. In this reasoning it is plain the importance
of groups, rather they define what premiss is worthwile and thus what proposition is suitable for our
aim. Now it would be very interesting to define what I called abstract logical groups. Of course I
shall not describe this formalization in its most formal fashion here, but who wants to read this topic
thoroughly, he can have a glance at [LGr].
As we have already seen (2) the certainty ′premiss-proposition′ means that both of them have to be
included into the same group, the group specified by the premisses. We may formalize this statment
by giving an algebraic structure to this kind of matter. Given our simple propositions ′p,q′ we can
form a set and we want to define a law of composition. If p ∈ A and q ∈ A, this law can be seen as a
function defined on A× A and taking its value in A. Thus the value of a propositional function f ( pˆ, qˆ)
for an ordered pair (p, q) ∈ A×A, is the composition of this pair under our law of composition. We call
magma a set endowed with a law of composition. Thus when we have a propositional composition
we have not a group yet. Now, given T, a law of composition (p, q) → pTq on A is associative if for
all the propositions ′p,q,r′ in A
(pTq)Tr = pT(qTr).
We call A stable under the law T if ATA ⊂ A (in this case it means subset).
In order to give the definition of group, we need the unit class. We denote by ι′p the class whose only
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member is p [RWP]:
ι′p = qˆ(q = p) Df
thus, ι′p means the class of objects which are identical with p. An identity element can be seen as
the highest degree of rational belief e, thus pTe = eTp = p. In this case we call our magma a
unital magma and given the associative law we call it monoid. A very important property is that of
invertibility. We have to bear in mind that in an abstract meaning every proposition (p) is invertible
(p′), that it to say p′Tp = e and pTp′ = e.
Besides the notion of internal composition there is the notion of action or external composition. Thus,
given two sets Ω and A, a mapping of Ω into the set AA of mappings of A into itself is called an action
of Ω on A. The propositional function fα(p) of A, where α ∈ Ω and p ∈ A is called the transformation
of p under α. Thus the element of Ω are called operators.
Now a monoid in which every element is invertible is called a group and a group with an action Ω
which is distributive with respect to the group law, is called a group with operators in Ω.
The Keynes’s probability may be built up from abstract logical groups. A very important kind of
consequence is the notion of logical homotheties which is the endomorphism of the underlying group
structure. In particular, given a fundamental proposition we can build a more complex proposition’s
framework up, thus an operator in Ω gives the homothety logic-ratio. This is an operator that is able
to enlarge a prior proposition given a certain ratio. For example a ratio (p and ·) or (p∨ qT·) et cetera.
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Appendix
a. Knowledge
derivative everything that we can deduce from self-evident
truths by the use of self-evident principles of de-
duction [PoP]. It is couched in terms of what ’we
can deduce’ and not in terms of what ’we have de-
duced’ [CtR]. It does not give rise by inference, but
by a pshycological inference which characterizes
the connection betwixt beliefs. It is exemplified by
the way in which a newspaper reader forms beliefs
[CtR].
intuitive is self-evident ’in the first and most absolute sense’
[PoP]. Alongside this kind of intuitive knowledge,
there is a special kind of it which is capable of
degree, hence it is not perfect but there may be
a doubt in underlying beliefs (such as memories,
ethical judgements and so forth). A knowledge
thought of as this kind of intuition implies that
there is no sharp distinction between knowledge
and probable opinion.
by description ’This is knowledge which involves knowing that
there is some one thing with certain properties even
though we do not know who or what it is, in the
sense that we are not acquainted with it’ [CtR].
b. Some logical symbols
• ` it is the assertion-sign (assertion, axiom, theorem);
• ., :, : . et cetera are the same of (, [, {;
• ∨,⊃,∼,≡, . are or, implication, negation, if and only if, and respectively;
• R denoted a relation;
• Df. means definition;
• the hat, i.e. xˆ, means a constant, a certain value of x, a defined one;
• ψ and φ are variables which range over propositional functions;
• ∃ and () means there exists and for all.
10 Francesco Strati
References
[CtR] (edited by) Griffin N., Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
[JWE] Johnson W.E., Logic, Vol.I st, Cambridge Press 1921.
[KeP] Keynes J.M., A treatise on probability, London Macmillan, 1921.
[RWP] Russell B., Whitehead N.A., Principia Mathematica Vol.I st, Macmillan, 1910.
[PoP] Russell B., The problems of philosophy, Williams and Norgate, 1912.
[LGr] Strati F., Abstract logical groups, 2012.
[FSP] Strati F., The weight of argument: A suggested interpretation, Post Keynesian Study Group,
PKWP1002, Cambridge 2010.
